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Abstract 
 
The pervasiveness of smartphones has made 
connecting with users through proximity based mobile 
social networks commonplace in today’s culture.  
Many such networks connect users by matching them 
based on shared interests. With ever-increasing 
concern for privacy, users are wary of openly sharing 
personal information with strangers.  Several methods 
have addressed this privacy concern such as 
encryption and k-anonymity, but none address issues of 
eliminating third party matches, achieving relevant 
matches, and prohibiting malicious users from 
inferring information based on their input into the 
system.  In this paper, we propose a matching scheme 
that accurately pairs similar users while 
simultaneously providing protection from malicious 
users inferring information.  Specifically, we match 
users in a proximity-based social network setting 
adapted from a framework of differential privacy.  This 
eliminates the need for third-party matching schemes, 
allows for accurate matching, and ensures malicious 
users will be unable to infer information from 
matching results. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The reliance on mobile devices is ever increasing in 
our current culture.  The pervasiveness of such devices 
allows for such conveniences as Location Based 
Services (LBSs). LBSs are mobile application services 
that provide a service, such as a restaurant 
recommendation, to a user based on their location.  
Foursquare and Yelp are two widely known LBSs.  
Social networking applications often utilize LBSs in 
Proximity Based Social Networking (PBSN), which is 
commonly used to match users based on similarities in 
interests in things like music, sports, movies, etc. 
Examples of PBSN’s are mobile dating applications 
such as Tinder, and Sonar.me.  A typical process for 
matching users in a PBSN is for an initiating party to 
broadcast a user’s interests to the other nearby users 
directly.   These users then decide if a connection will 
be made based on similarities between them and the 
initiator.  The result will either be a match, or no 
match, based on some similarity computation.  
Although this scheme is effective, unfortunately, it 
sacrifices the privacy of the users.  Users might not feel 
comfortable broadcasting their interests if it is related 
to sensitive matters.  It is not hard to imagine a 
scenario where a user maintains a personal persona 
separate from their professional persona.  Bad things 
could happen if this user were matched with a fellow 
employee who might reveal sensitive information 
about the user in the workplace.  Also, users may 
experience loss of privacy if a malicious user 
systematically changes their interests until a match is 
made with another user. It allows the malicious user to 
infer information about other users interests by simply 
using the application how it is intended. Common 
approaches of encryption and k-anonymity do not 
successfully address preserving user privacy while 
simultaneously producing accurate results.  
 
1.1. Related Word 
  
Various solutions have been proposed in recent 
years [1,7,8,9,13,14] to address the issues of preserving 
privacy while matching users.  These solutions all 
assume the user has multiple interests chosen from a 
public set of defined interests. These interests range 
from things like what type of music a person likes, to 
how often do they consume alcohol. 
[10] matches users by both the number of common 
interests and the corresponding interest weight on each 
of the individual users.  They argue this allows for 
more accurate fine-grained matches.  Instead of peer to 
peer sharing of data to find user matches, [10] relies on 
a third-party matching scheme.  The problem with this 
reliance on a third-party is that they maintain a central 
repository for all user data and therefore are subject to 
a central point of failure if the third-party entity is 
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somehow compromised.  [10] also relies on 
computationally expensive encryption techniques that 
do not address the issue of a malicious user inferring 
other user information based on their interests and 
match results.   
[6] incorporates differential privacy by perturbing 
data with noise from the Laplace distribution and using 
secure multi-party computation (SMC) for matching. 
They utilize a blocking step when processing the data 
for SMC.  This filters out records that will not be part 
of the join result and ensures the cost of matching 
during SMC will be at acceptable levels.  Instead of 
using common k-anonymity techniques to sanitize the 
data, they leverage differential privacy.  Essentially, 
they group records according to their attributes and 
then use noise drawn from the Laplacian distribution to 
either suppress a record or add a fake record.  If the 
noise is positive they add fake records to the dataset, 
and if it is negative they suppress records from the 
dataset.  Their experimental analysis aims at reducing 
the cost of private matching records.  Although they 
show their approach provides strong privacy 
guarantees, their effectiveness in reducing matching 
costs is approximately the same as the k-anonymity 
versions.   
The approach in [6] essentially uses the noise from 
the Laplacian distribution as a binary decision to add or 
suppress data.  This is fundamentally different from 
our approach.  We add noise from the Laplace 
distribution to all attributes of a given record.  The 
experimental results of [6] also focus on reducing the 
cost of SMC so it is unclear as to how accurate their 
matching results are.   
[7] develops an approach to publish search queries 
and click data in the form of a click query graph.  A 
query is only published if the query frequency plus 
some added noise exceeds some threshold.  Their 
findings are that the more stringent the privacy 
requirement, the higher the threshold, and 
consequently the fewer the number of queries that can 
be safely published.  Their approach is similar to [6] in 
the way they information is released based on some 
threshold. Our research differs in the way we use 
Laplacian noise with data.  We don not suppress data 
based on some threshold as [7] does.  It is also unclear 
if the approach in [7] relies on third parties.  The 
experimental analysis of [7] found that keywords 
obtained with the perturbed data closely resemble the 
original unperturbed data.  Whether this translates to a 
more general case of matching users is unclear.   
[8] avoids the issues with third party matching by 
directly calculating matches between two users based 
on a maximal intersection of interest sets where 
interest is defined as a string up to a certain length.  
Calculations are computed locally on each user’s 
machine.  It is unclear how accurate the matches 
between users is with this approach, and no data is 
provided regarding accuracy.  Also, the set matching 
technique in [8] does not address the issue of malicious 
users inferring information because when one user 
attempts to match with another, they can infer interests 
of the other from the matching results.   
[13] uses three different protocols to match users in 
PBSN’s.  These protocols assume an honest but 
curious user and do not address the scenario of a 
malicious user who changes input and observes output 
to infer information of another user.  The paper states 
that if a malicious user Bob repeatedly tries to match 
with a user Alice by creating fake profiles, he can 
eventually learn Alice’s profile information.  To 
combat this problem, they suggest limiting the number 
of times that Bob can attempt to match to Alice.  
Unfortunately, this suggestion is not an adequate 
solution to the problem our paper focuses on; ensuring 
that user profile information is safe from malicious 
users.  Although [13] provides adequate protocols for 
an honest but curious scenario, they do not address the 
problems that are the focus of our paper.  
 [14] matches users with similarity calculations 
based on prioritizing and weighting individual 
interests.  This is done without the use of a third party 
matching scheme, but a malicious user can still infer 
knowledge by repeatedly querying nearby users and 
analyzing results.  Again the accuracy of matches is 
not thoroughly examined in this research.   
The problem of secure matching discussed in this 
paper is similar to secure recommender systems. 
Cryptographic solutions to the problem of secure 
recommender systems such as [5,6] focus on removing 
the third-party recommenders.  They do not attempt to 
limit the amount of knowledge malicious users can 
infer through using the system as intended.    
[9] develops a differentially private recommender 
system that provides guarantees of privacy for users.  
Their system ensures some level of privacy against 
malicious users inferring information from the use of 
systems that recommend movies from the Netflix 
dataset.  The approach in this work is developed for a 
specific recommender system that uses certain 
statistical steps.  This approach does not generalize to 
all recommenders and therefore does not work for our 
research. Technical differences between our work are 
in the way we use the interest weight of a user as the 
count query function where they compute a covariance 
matrix.  Lastly, the general objective of the research in 
[9] is different from ours.  [9] uses statistical methods 
to aggregate user data and recommend movies where 
our work involves mutual selection between two 
parties by focusing on user to user matching, not an 
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aggregation of some number of user records to 
recommend something to a given user. 
[11] develops a lightweight recommender system 
that uses perturbed data for existing recommender 
systems.  Data is perturbed locally and their system 
works with existing recommenders.  Perturbing the 
data locally ensures their objective of privacy 
preservation is met and allows their data to be used 
with third party recommenders.  Their experimental 
analysis shows that recommendation accuracy is 
preserved while perturbing the data.  Our research 
differs in the general objective.  Similar to the 
differences with [9], [11] focuses on recommending 
products to a user based on aggregating some number 
of user records to find the most relevant product.  It is 
unclear how this approach would generalize to our 
objective of finding the best match from direct user to 
user matching.    
A common approach to preserving privacy in data 
is anonymization.  This involves methods such as k-
anonymity.  K-anonymity typically attempts to 
anonymize data with two techniques: suppression and 
generalization. Suppression involves removing or 
masking certain attributes in the dataset and 
generalization involves replacing individual values of 
attributes with a general range.  The problem with 
these approaches as shown in [1] is that the 
anonymization techniques often used render the data 
useless for matching algorithms.  Differential privacy 
does not experience this problem.  
 
1.1. Contributions 
  
The contributions of this work are to implement a 
matching algorithm to be used for PBSN’s that 
provides differential privacy guarantees for the users.  
The challenge of this task is to provide accurate 
matching while maintaining privacy.  This challenge is 
overcome by developing a matching algorithm within 
the framework of differential privacy.  The issue of 
using a third-party matching scheme is arbitrarily 
solved by calculating the matching metrics for users 
directly on their devices.  Furthermore, third-party 
matching schemes could be used as long as the data 
they received was already differentially private.  The 
issue of malicious users inferring user information 
from the results of the algorithm is addressed by 
applying differentially private techniques to user’s 
interest data.  Specifically, perturbing the data using 
random noise drawn from the Laplace distribution. 
Applying the Laplace mechanism to each user’s 
interest data set ensures that a malicious user will not 
be able to determine a user’s interests and that 
subsequent queries will also not leak information. 
Users privacy will be guaranteed up to some , 
meaning no user will be able to definitively infer each 
interest level of another user.  The similarity between 
two users is calculated with the Pearson coefficient 
similarity metric, a common similarity metric used in 
matching algorithms. 
 
2. Preliminaries  
 
2.1. Dataset and Distance 
  
In this research, a dataset x is a collection of 
interests from the universe U of all possible interests.  
When a given user does not have an interest in a 
particular attribute, the interest will remain in the 
dataset with a weight of 0.  Our universe U of interests 
is U = {interesti, …interestn} where i = 1 … n and n is 
the total number of possible interests.  Given this 
definition, we can define the distance between two 
datasets x, y with the l1 norm as [3]:  
 
 
 
The dataset used for our experiments consists of 
weight vectors of user interests. Weights for interests 
range from 0-5 where 0 indicates no preference (no 
interest) and 5 indicates strong preference. An attribute 
in the dataset is an individual weight for a user interest. 
 
2.2. Differential Privacy 
 
Differential privacy formalizes the idea that the 
output of some computation does not allow inference 
to be made on the presence or absence of any record in 
the computations input.  More formally, it requires that 
for any outcome of a randomized computation, that 
outcome should be nearly equally likely with and 
without any one record [9]. A randomized computation 
M satisfies -differential privacy if for any adjacent 
dataset X and Y, and any subset S of possible 
outcomes Range(M), 
 
 
 
The guarantee differential privacy provides can be 
interpreted as a bound on the ability to infer from any 
output event S, whether the input to the computation 
was X or Y [3].  In our project, this means inference 
about the presence or absence of any given attribute 
(user interest) is bounded by a factor of  
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It is important to note that differential privacy is a 
property used in our algorithm that outputs matches.  It 
is not the output itself.  Differential privacy is a privacy 
guarantee for some defined . 
 
2.3. Laplace Mechanism 
 
The Laplace Mechanism is used to ensure 
differential privacy with our matches.  This works by 
perturbing a counting query  with noise distributed 
according to a Laplace distribution centered at 0 with 
scale ,        
Lap(x| ) =  
 
then the Laplace mechanism is defined as: 
   where Z is a random variable 
drawn from the Laplace distribution.  The Laplace 
Mechanism is proven to ensure differential privacy [3].  
In our work, the counting query function  is simply 
the preference count for a given interest.  Similar to 
counting a population of people represented in a 
dataset that smoke, the preference count represents the 
number of bits that represent the amount of interest a 
user has in a specific area. 
 
2.4. Similarity Metrics and Matching 
 
Matching in our work is where for a given user 
Alice from a set of N users, a similarity metric is 
calculated for the N-1 users and the user with the 
highest similarity score to Alice is the one she is 
matched with. Each user has a set of interests 
represented as a weight vector and inputted into the 
Lapalce mechanism.  The output of the Laplace 
mechanism from one user to the rest is used to 
compute the Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC), 
which computes the similarity between two users.  
PCC in this instance shows the linear relationship 
between two weight vectors.  PCC output ranges 
between -1 and 1 where a value greater than 1 would 
be a positive relationship for the vectors, a value less 
than 0 would be a negative relationship, and a value of 
0 would be no relationship at all. 
 
2.5. Adversary Models 
 
A common user scheme for this type of research is 
to consider the user honest-but-curious [10][3][8].  
This research addresses the honest-but-curious user 
approach as well as the malicious user approach. This 
malicious user has the power to modify interest weight 
input until a match is made with a targeted user, or 
information is inferred about the user.  In this scheme, 
any given user can act as the malicious user. 
 
3. Problem Description  
 
The protocol in our approach is a PBSN that 
involves n users geographically close, who are trying 
to match with each other based on shared interests.  
This protocol does not rely on interacting with a third 
party matching entity.  The process is divided into two 
phases: creating differentially private user datasets, and 
matching users.  An example assumes n users where 
each user has their own preference dataset Ip = <Ip1, Ip2. 
…, Ipn>. The PBSN application ensures each users 
dataset is differentially private.  Each user dataset is 
then shared with all n-1 users and the similarity is 
computed.  The most similar user to a given user Alice 
is the one matched to Alice. This can also be 
generalized to the most similar k users, where k can 
equal 1 to n-1. 
 
3.1. Phase I 
 
In this phase, the Laplace mechanism is applied to a 
given user’s preference dataset.  This is done locally on 
each user’s machine.  This eliminates the need for a 
third-party matching system as well as sharing 
unperturbed data with other users.  The Laplace 
mechanism adds random noise to each interest count 
drawn from the Laplace distribution.  Once the Laplace 
mechanism outputs the perturbed dataset, it can be 
shared with all other n-1 users. 
 
3.2. Phase II 
 
In this phase, a user calculates their matching 
similarity with all n-1 users.  This is done by 
calculating the PCC for a given user amongst all other 
users with their provided perturbed dataset.  The user 
with the highest similarity to a user Alice will be the 
one she is matched with.   
Since the datasets used in the matching satisfy 
differential privacy for some , Alice cannot determine 
definitively the exact interests and weights that 
achieved this match. Furthermore, each user can 
control the privacy they are comfortable with by 
adjusting the noise metric used in their differential 
privacy calculation. 
 
4. Experiments  
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The experiments in this paper consist of 
simulations of PBSNs that pair similar users.  The 
simulations are implemented in Python and the dataset 
used is a real world dataset pertaining to the interests, 
habits fears, and opinions of  young people between 
the ages of 15 and 30 in Slovakia.  The responses to 
each question are in the form of a scale where 0 
denotes no interest and 5 denotes a strong interest [16].  
There are a total of 1010 participants and  a total  of 
140 attributes for each respondent. Three experiments 
are performed to analyze the trade-off in accuracy vs 
privacy, as well as validate accuracy and usefulness of 
our system.  Experiment 1 calculates the number of 
features vs the matching accuracy for different 
amounts of noise ( ) drawn from the Laplace 
distribution.  Experiment 2 computes the best match 
for one sample with an  of 0. The placement of this 
best match in similarity lists (list of highest scoring 
matches to lowest scoring, for a given amount of noise) 
of various  is compared.  Experiment 3 computes the 
match for multiple values of .  The rank of these 
matches on a baseline similarity list is compared.   
 
4.1. Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 compares the trade-off between 
accuracy and privacy ( ) with various feature sizes. 
Here, features represent the weight vectors of users 
interests.  For each , we compute the best match with 
10, 50, 90, and 130 features.  A random sample is 
drawn from the dataset to compute the PCC against all 
other samples. The values for  that we compare are 
0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9.  The baseline  that we 
compare all others to is  = 0 which means no noise is 
added to the data.  For the baseline, as the number of 
features included in the similarity calculation increases, 
the similarity score decreases. After computing the 
baseline for the various feature sizes, we then generate 
a similarity score between all users, for all values of .  
For each , we now have a list of similarity scores 
between all the samples and the randomly chosen one.  
From here, we use the highest scoring calculation from 
each feature size in the baseline and find it in the 
similarity lists for each .  This allows us to compare 
the accuracy of the baseline match and the different 
amount of privacy applied to the system.  The results 
of this are displayed in Figure 1. 
 
4.2. Experiment 2 
 
In this experiment, we compute the PCC for one 
randomly chosen sample against all other samples in 
our dataset.  Our baseline used for comparison is when 
 = 0.  Like before, we obtain lists of similarity scores 
by computing PCC between the random sample and all 
others for  = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9.  We do this for 
feature sizes of 10 to 140, where the feature size 
increases by 10 each time. This results in a total of 14 
features sizes.  We next compare the highest scoring 
match in the baseline at each feature size to the 
similarity lists for each  size.  Specifically, we 
calculate where the baseline match sits in the similarity 
list for each , and we store this in a matrix.  From 
here, we can compute the average distance of how far 
away a value for  places the baseline match across all 
feature sizes. The results of this are displayed in figure 
2. 
 
4.3. Experiment 3 
 
Experiment 3 computes the PCC for one randomly 
chosen sample against all other samples in our dataset.  
Our baseline used for comparison is once again when  
= 0.  In this experiment we compute a similarity list for 
the baseline.  We then compute the highest scoring 
match for each value of  across all feature sizes 
(feature sizes are the same as experiment 2). After this, 
we check to see where the highest scoring match for 
each value of  rank in the baseline similarity list.  We 
essentially reverse the comparison done in experiment 
2.  Results of experiment 3 are found in figure 3. 
 
5. Experimental Evaluation  
 
The general findings of our experiments show that 
although there is a trade-off between accuracy and 
privacy when matching users, our system matches 
users with high similarity even with significant noise 
added to the data  
 
5.1. Experiment 1 Evaluation 
 
The results of experiment 1 reveal multiple 
findings.  In general,   figure 1 shows that as a number 
of features used in calculating similarity increases, the 
similarity scores decrease.  It is obvious that when the 
feature set is more robust there will be less similarity 
between users, because  there are more features to 
consider, resulting in a decrease in score.  This holds 
true whether or not noise is added to the data. 
The most important finding from experiment 1 is 
that as the noise added to the data increases, the 
Page 1841
  
accuracy of the matching algorithm decreases, but not 
significantly for   0.5.  This has been noted in 
previous research [9] and is now displayed in our novel 
approach.  Our system maintains relatively high 
matching accuracy even with significant noise added to 
the data    
The takeaway from this experiment is that PBSN’s 
are capable of overcoming the challenge of not 
allowing malicious users to infer information thus 
preserving user privacy in matching algorithms.  
Figure 1 shows that depending on the data for a 
particular PBSN; consideration is required to find the 
right balance between a number of features used for 
calculating similarity, the amount of noise to add to the 
data, and how much variation in accuracy to allow in 
the system.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Each line represents some  of 
privacy.  The comparison of privacy vs 
accuracy is compared to various sizes of 
features used in computing similarity between 
two samples.  The red line has no noise 
added, and serves as the comparison for all 
others. 
 
5.2. Experiment 2 Evaluation 
 
Results from experiment 1 show that striking the 
right balance between feature size and privacy can 
allow our system to still perform highly accurate 
matching.  Experiment 2 looks at the accuracy from a 
different perspective and aids in validating the findings 
from Experiment 1.   
Results of experiment 2 show that for   0.5,  the 
baseline highest scoring match for a given feature size 
is less than six users away from the top of the 
similarity lists for each  on average.  This is a 
significant finding because it shows that adding noise 
up to 0.5 keeps the relative order for the k closest 
matches intact and still matches users with high 
similarity.  This means that although our system might 
not match the true highest scoring match, it matches on 
one of the top six.  Even on our relatively small dataset 
of approximately 1000 users, the top ten closest 
matches were always within a similarity score with a 
range of no more than 10%. 
The impact of this finding is great for PBSN’s.  It 
ensures that even if a differentially private system does 
not match a user to the user with the highest similarity 
score, it will be one of the top six. When more features 
are used to calculate the similarity between two users, 
similarity scores decrease.  This means that the reality 
of a perfect match is more difficult to achieve.  
Because of this, our system works as well (for   0.5) 
as a system with no noise added.  For practical 
purposes in industry, our system is acceptable.   
 
 
Fig. 2. This illustrates the distance for the 
nearest neighbor in the baseline to the various 
.  Each column is the average distance 
across all feature sizes. 
 
5.3. Experiment 3 Evaluation 
 
Results from experiment 3 reinforce findings in 
experiments 1 and 2.  Here, we look at where the 
highest scoring matches for various rank in the 
baseline similarity list. 
The general results of experiment 3 show that the 
highest scoring matches for all   0.5 are one of the 
top 26 matches in the baseline similarity list.  Figure 3 
shows that for the highest scoring matches for   0.5, 
these matches are in the list of the top six matches for 
the baseline.  This further shows that not only does the 
datasets with added noise (   0.5) keep the highest 
scoring matches for the baseline among their top six 
matches, the highest scoring matches resulting from 
the perturbed dataset are amongst the top six matches 
in the baseline.   
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The findings in this experiment show that the 
although the matches made with the noisy datasets 
might not be the absolute best match, they are one of 
the top six for   0.5.  This means that on average, our 
system will match a user with one of the top six most 
similar users for an   0.5 across all feature sizes.  
This illustrates the practicality of our system for 
industry use.    
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Compares where the highest scoring 
nearest neighbor for various  ranks on the 
baseline similarity score list.   
 
5.4. Comparison of our Solution to Related 
Works 
 
The results of our work shows that our system is 
resilient overcomes the limitations that other works 
have experienced.  Different from [10] our work does 
not rely on third-party matching or computationally 
expensive encryption algorithms.  Also, we ensure  
differential privacy for users data, which [8] and [14] 
suffer from as well.  Our results show relatively 
accurate matching, compared to the ambiguous results 
of [8].  Unlike approaches that use k-anonymity, our 
system considers all attributes in the dataset and 
produces accurate matching even with some noise 
added to the data.  
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this work, we draw the conclusion that our 
matching system with differential privacy guarantees is 
practical, feasible, and produces highly accurate 
matching.  Although the loss of accuracy does increase 
as more noise is added to the data, our system is 
resilient for significant levels of noise. 
For matching systems used in industry, it is 
typically not required that the best match be made, 
rather, a match between two users with high similarity.  
We have demonstrated that our system performs well 
in this setting. We generally match users to one of their 
top six most similar neighbors while adding noise to 
the data. Our system does not rely third party matching 
schemes and allows users to set the privacy level they 
are comfortable with.   
Directions for future work include expanding our 
system to work with other data sets and testing 
different matching protocols.  Also, fully realizing our 
system by implementing it in an application that can be 
tested on mobile devices in a real world setting.   
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